Like a few other developing nations that are identified as "emerging economies," India has been experiencing rising inflows of overseas capital since the gradual deregulation of its financial sector, which started in the early 1990s. Unlike what is claimed by those who abide by the neoliberal norms of "efficiency" in deregulated financial markets, what is being experienced by these emerging economies in reality is ridden with pitfalls, trade-offs, and trilemmas that come in the process causing a lot of concern. We propose to have a fresh look at the related issues for India, a country often looked upon as a "success story" by many (Stiglitz 2010a) , not only in the context of the country's financial management policies during the Asian crisis, but even in terms of the handling of the current global crisis. Contesting such claims, we would report in this paper the traps and pitfalls encountered by the country in implementing such policies, a matter that deserves attention.
The paper has four major sections, followed by one that offers the conclusion. Section I deals with the pattern of India's integration with the global financial market since 1991, tracing back the policy changes that initiated this process. Section II dwells on the hurdles faced in the management of India's financial sector, in particular, with the following as competing demands: a) maintaining price stability by using controls on domestic monetary policy; b) achieving competitive real exchange rates; and c) ensuring uninterrupted flows of capital from abroad.
The three issues, often identified as "impossible trinity" in the literature (Lemgruber 2008) , question the feasibility of achieving domestic targets in monetary and exchange rate policies, along with maintaining free capital flows to/from abroad. Section III of the paper brings up two other concerns that are hardly noticed. These include: a) the fiscal implications of monetary management, which inflict social costs to the economy; and b) financialization in deregulated markets, as it spills over to commodity markets with futures trading.
As for the first, efforts on the part of the government to sterilize the cash inflows (caused by the rising capital inflows) led to the sale of government bonds. The latter, in turn, tends to inflate the interest burden in the fiscal budget. With fiscal deficit as a proportion of GDP subject to compression in terms of the ongoing official Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBMA), the primary deficit shrinks proportionately, given that it is even less than the fiscal deficit. 1 With defense expenditure subject to strategic concerns, the end result is one where cuts take place in the other two components of expenditure in the primary budget, which include capital expenditure and subsidies. The social consequences of the above are no less a cause of concern than those arising from financial crisis and lack of stability. As for financialization, we draw attention to speculation, not only in equity market, but also in commodities, with futures trading providing further opportunities for profits in the sharp uptrend and fluctuation in commodity prices. Section IV provides a perspective as to how the Indian policy moves are viewed by different commentators. It also provides an account of the current moves and roadblocks in advanced countries in reinstituting regulation in financial markets, problems that incidentally compare with the Indian scene. We end with a concluding note in section V.
I. FINANCIAL DEREGULATION IN INDIA AND LINKS TO GLOBAL FINANCIAL

MARKETS
Financial opening was initiated as part of a package of economic reforms launched in India in 1991. This brought an end to a policy regime that had been subject to segregated banking, complimented by manifold restrictions on the flow of overseas capital. (e) rise in price/earnings (P/E) ratios of stocks traded, often at levels higher than compared to those in overseas stock markets;
(f) value of stocks sold in the primary market at levels much lower than those in the secondary market; and (g) rising trading activity in the commodity futures market for a large number of commodities.
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Observations in this section are based on statistics appended at end to the paper in appendix charts 1-7.
MANAGING THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: TRAPS ON WAY?
As has been the case with other emerging economies (which have been exposed to the recent turbulence in global financial markets), cross- 5 Amongst its many functions, the Reserve Bank of India also acts as the banker of last resort. In this role, the central bank has to ensure that it can inject funds into the system to help participants tide over temporary mismatches of funds. Refinance, as it used to happen earlier, was at a fixed rate that was largely divorced from the cost of equivalent short-term funds in the market. This gave rise to a nonegalitarian distribution of interest rates in the short end of the curve. Further, the amounts that could be borrowed were determined by a preset limit. To do away with the deficiencies, in 2000, the RBI moved to an auction system of repos and reverse repos to suck out from and inject liquidity into the market. The three broad objectives of LAF included: a greater flexibility for the RBI in determining both the quantum of adjustment, as also the rates by responding to the system on a daily basis; to ensure that the injected funds were being used to fund day-to-day liquidity mismatches and not to finance more permanent assets; and finally, to help RBI set a corridor for short-term rates, ideally governed by the reverse-repo (top band) and repo (lower band) rates. This would impart greater stability in the markets. For more information, see www.debtonnet.com.
call rates (Leeladhar 2008) . We provide in tables 1-3 of the appendix the details of these measures, as well as their impact on liquidity, according to official estimates.
However, despite these measures, monetary authorities failed to achieve many of their goals. We notice, from available statistics, the upward trend in the real exchange rates of the rupee. Barring one or two years, and notwithstanding the efforts on the part of the RBI to contain those movements by using LAF, MSS, and even direct purchases of a part of the foreign currency inflows (which were absorbed in official reserves), the real exchange rate appreciation has been continuing for the rupee since 1991 (see appendix chart 9). Again, accumulation of official reserves (of foreign exchange), which are part of reserve money, potentially contributed to expansions in the domestic money supply (M 2 , as well as M 3 ), which called for further sterilization. Moreover, selling government securities had to be competitive in the domestic market, thus setting a floor for the interest rate in the market. However, the upward push in interest rate was, to a certain extent, in accord with the dear money policy the RBI was pursuing With the successive deregulation of the capital account, which had led to excessive inflows of short-term capital to the country since the early 1990, policies in India to manage the financial sector restrained officials from having full sway over what could be considered as more appropriate from the point of view of domestic output growth, employment, or even distribution of credit. 6 In addition, as already mentioned above, efforts to counter the impact of foreign currency inflows on the exchange rate of the domestic currency also failed to arrest the unwanted appreciations in the real exchange rate that took place over those years, thus undermining the cost competiveness of Indian goods in the domestic, as well as overseas, markets.
B. Monetary Management in India since the Beginning of Global Crisis in October 2008
We now We would discuss the two aspects of monetary management mentioned above in the following section, pointing at further problems and dilemmas that remain rather neglected in the literature.
III. MANAGING THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: SOME MORE ISSUES
Financialization of markets, an offshoot of financial deregulation, does not remain confined to financial assets alone, a fact that is evident in the much talked about subprime loan crisis in the housing market of the United States. With channels of speculation opening up for short-term capital, the flows spill over across markets that include financial assets, real estate, and commodity exchanges, along with various types of OTCs. An outcome as above can be related to the observations we made earlier in this paper relating to the "financialization" of the commodity market. Speculation and portfolio adjustments across markets on part of financial agents led, as a contagion, to spurts in commodity markets when the financial market was also at its boom. Thereafter the crash in financial asset prices and in its turnover has led the same agents to look to commodities again as alternative sources of returns on their funds, with investments in commodity futures. The latter, as observed, pushed up the spot prices, implying a betting on rising prices with speculators holding long positions.
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With rising food prices, futures markets in agricultural commodities, especially in cereals, pulses, and other essential food items, are currently subject to public debates in India, especially when it relates to the fresh opening of those markets for essential food items that earlier had been delisted. Even international organizations have drawn attention to the pitfalls that lie ahead for countries (including India) in trying to open futures trading in commodities.
As held for India by the international think-tank IFPRI, "rising expectations, hoarding, and 10 Food items that have been traded in future markets of India in recent years include (among others) coffee, barley, ground nuts, sugar, desi, tur, urad, and rice (until January 2007); castor seed, guar gum, gur, jeera, maize, masoor, gram, mustard seed, pepper, oil cake, and soya oil (until January 2008); sugar (until January 2009); and, finally, chili, castor seed, coriander, potato, dhania, and wheat (until now). Futures trading, in earlier months but discontinued now, can still be identifies a factor explaining the current spate of price increases in the commodity markets. Speculation in commodity trading also has been a major component in the OTC trading with forward contracts that, as mentioned earlier, are legalized (Sen and Paul 2010) . On the whole, official policies in India to manage the surges in speculative short-term capital inflows in the money market have not been able to arrest its spill-over to the commodity market, which continues to provide profits to financiers on futures and forward trading. The end result has been the unrelenting inflation in food prices, which affects the survival of large sections of population in India
We now pay attention to one more effect of deregulation in financial markets, which, as we point out, has often been neglected. The issue relates to interventions of monetary authorities, initially in the forex market (to acquire the additional supply of exchange in order to prevent appreciation of the domestic currency), and later in the domestic money market, to mop up liquidity that may be generated by such additions to high-powered money. The above involves sale of government securities, which, sold at market rates, adds to the interest bill as a The more recent moves of the government to come out of the stimulus package that has sustained the fiscal deficit at higher levels over the last two fiscal years may further harden the picture. We provide the figures for the share of the primary as well as the fiscal deficit as proportions of GDP in appendix figure 17. One also gets an idea, in figure 19 , of the rising share on interest rate charges and debt servicing as a proportion of nonplan expenditure, especially in contrast to the low share of food subsidies.
Aspects as above deserve attention, and more so because the benefits of financial deregulation remain confined to those who can speculate in markets, while the costs are borne by those who are affected by speculation on commodity prices and cuts in social sector spending by the government, as we point out above.
IV. PERSPECTIVES ON MONETARY MANAGEMENT IN INDIA
Of late, India has been receiving considerable attention as one of the few countries that has managed to successfully withstand the consequences of the latest global crisis. Much of it is attributed to successful management by the country's monetary authorities, and especially by the RBI. Quoting a statement from Joseph Stiglitz, one of the staunch critics of globalization, "...your policymakers, particularly the Reserve Bank of India, are already doing a great job. I wish the U.S. Federal Reserve displayed the same understanding of the role of regulation that the RBI has done, at least so far" (Stiglitz 2010a ). He further remarks, "India was one of the countries that resisted the wholesale deregulation movement that the United States had been exporting… They [India] did it against political pressure… and now I think the financial markets are thankful that they did resist those pressures. The result is that India's financial markets are in better shape than they would have been if they had engaged in the kind of wholesale deregulation that the United States engaged in" (Stiglitz 2010b ). The argument rests on what he notices as India's ability to continue with regulations in the banking sector, in contrast to the wide-ranging deregulations in the banking sector of the United States (and Europe as well) (Stiglitz 2010a and .
A rather similar view has recently been aired by Gerald Epstein, another leading critic of the theory behind financial deregulation and its application in the United States and elsewhere.
Mentioning the restraints in India on trading of derivatives by banks, Epstein commends the role of the RBI in monetary management, thus mentioning "... Reddy [the RBI governor] who was the devil… now... has turned a hero who saved the Indian financial system" (Epstein 2010 ). The observation is based on what Epstein believes as the ability of the RBI, first, to judge the quality of new financial products (derivatives, etc.) in the market and issue approvals solely on that basis, and second, the monitoring by RBI of bank performance while issuing "guidelines and safeguards." At end of the Asian crisis, India's strategy of capital flow management was appreciated as a success story by Epstein, Grabel, and Jomo (2003) . However, since then the pace of deregulation in the financial sphere has been much faster and more pervading, a fact that speaks for the discordant notes we have offered in this paper.
In our judgment, observations as above underestimate the potentials of systemic risk and its social cost as are embedded in India's liberalized financial sector. Our analysis of the successive stages in the near-full liberalization of external capital flows and the domestic financial market-with explosion of short-term flows of capital, as are driven by speculation across markets of financial assets and commodities, the wide-ranging use of exchange traded, as well as OTC derivatives, and finally, the incidence of financial liberalization in terms of cuts in social sector spending-all bear testimony to the lack of reality of those positions.
However, one observes an element of unanimity on the volatility aspect of short-term capital flows. Thus, concerns are shared by Stiglitz as he points out that "... this crisis should send three strong messages to India. One, think very carefully about financial market regulation.
Full capital market liberalization should clearly be put off. Two, be prepared to take offsetting actions to counter volatility flowing in from abroad. Finally, pursue growth from a diversified economic base, which includes developing countries and your own huge domestic potential" (Stiglitz 2010a) . Echoing the same sentiment, Epstein concludes on a discerning note on risky toxic assets, and he points out "...If you cannot figure out how risky the asset is within reasonable limits, do not approve it" (Epstein 2010) . It echoes the much-quoted cautionary note from George Soros, the billionaire investor in capital markets who claimed that derivatives (and crisis in global markets. 13 However, the free flow of capital across and within the country encourages speculation under uncertainty. The latter is bound to generate volatility in financial markets, providing sources of profits under speculation. Thus it requires action that goes beyond words, especially from official agencies, to successfully manage and counter the consequences of excess capital inflows subject to volatility.
We may mention here a path-breaking move in the United States with the recent bill on the regulation of Wall Street that was passed by a majority in the Senate on May 20, 2010. As put by a commentator, "...prodded by national anger at Wall Street, the Senate on Thursday passed the most far-reaching restraints on big banks since the Great Depression" (Kuhnhenn NO DATE). The bill, accepted by the House, will be a landmark victory of regulatory bodies over the free-for-all reign of speculation in the U.S. financial market, by restraining banks from dealing in risky assets and providing a lot of protection to the retail investor or the individual homeowner on mortgages. As put by President Obama, "Over the last year, the financial industry has repeatedly tried to end this reform with hordes of lobbyists and millions of dollars in ads, and when they couldn't kill it they tried to water it down. Today, I think it's fair to say these efforts have failed" (Drawbaugh and Sullivan 2010) .
We draw attention to the above step taken by the U.S. administration in order to urge upon a need for similar actions in India and other emerging economies where the recent moves for financial deregulation have been in the opposite direction.
V. CONCLUSION
What can be concluded from our analysis of monetary management since the start of financial deregulation in India? We think it can be summed up in the following six observations and policy conclusions:
a) The extent of monetary management in India has not been in keeping up with the need to control the rising inflows of short-term capital, often led by the FIIs, which destabilizes stock markets and the exchange rate of the domestic currency.
b) Net flows of overseas capital, in excess of the sum absorbed to finance the current account deficit, has put upward pressures on the real exchange rate of the rupee. To counter the latter, monetary authorities have been mopping up foreign currency with direct purchases of latter, along with sales of government securities to absorb excess liquidity. Also the exchange, converted to rupees in the domestic market, is sought to be sterilized by sales of government securities to absorb excess liquidity. While purchase of foreign currency contributes to rising official reserves (and thus to highpowered money), it has the potential of adding further to the money supply. As for absorption (or sterilization) of liquidity by selling securities to public, the act adds to the interest bill for the government in its budget, which in turn entails social costs by inducing cuts in public expenditure on social programs and investments, with ongoing restraints on the fiscal deficits. f) Monetary management has not been able to prevent steady appreciation in the real exchange rate of rupee, a fact that is visible in the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate (REER). This has made Indian goods less competitive in relation to foreign products, both with exports in overseas markets and with imports in domestic markets.
Concluding, one does not see much logic or an awareness of the social costs in pushing further the agenda of monetary management in the direction of full capital account convertibility in India. To allow the free flow of finance to feed transactions in the country's secondary stock markets, and also to permit the use of derivative instruments to hedge and speculate, has created further space for those who want to use money to make more money while contributing little to growth and stability in the real economy. 
